Sections 25 and 26 are substantially predicated on the presumption that such confessions were forced and hence lack the voluntariness, authenticity, and guilty conscience that should be connected with them. In the United Kingdom, the admissibility of confessions was determined solely based on voluntariness. As police brutality methods evolved, courts eventually invalidated this methodology, including new characteristics such as brutality, psychological manipulations, and others. In India, the presumption of police techniques continues to loom large, whereas in England, a different path has been chosen, one that burdens the prosecution rather than limiting admissibility. Furthermore, the controversial Section 27 of the IEA adds to the growing number of examples of police brutality. According to Section 27, if a fact is discovered as a result of a confession made while in police custody, it can be admitted if it is proven. As a result, any fact revealed verifying a part of the confession can be accepted. It should be a reality that would have remained unknown if the confession had not been made. When a confession given to police is deemed inadmissible, this Section encourages officers to adopt harsh measures to extract a confession and discover a later fact.[1]
Admission is necessary in judicial proceedings because if one of the parties to the judicial proceeding proves that the other party has admitted the fact in issue or the relevant facts in the case, it is easier for the Court to administer justice effectively. After all, the Court does not need to take much evidence and does not have to get involved in the judicial proceedings. After all, the question of the case has already been settled by one of the parties in the judicial proceeding. The sections of the Indian Evidence Act that deal with admission are numbered 17 to 23.
In the Evidence Act, the term "admission" implies "when any person willingly recognises the existence of any fact in dispute or facts." As we discovered in the instance of confession, the Evidence Act does not adequately characterise confession, and similarly, the Indian Evidence Act does not adequately articulate the term "admission" in a broad sense.
According to Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, an admission is any statement, whether oral, documentary or electronic, that has sufficient probative value to imply or conclude any inference as to any fact in the dispute or relevant fact.
Admissions do not follow a set schedule; however, they might be formal or informal. The formal admission, also known as a judicial admission, is made during a legal procedure, whereas the informal admission is made during routine day-to-day activities such as in the ordinary course of life. Under Section 58 of the same legislation, formal admissions or judicial admissions are acceptable by a court of law and have a considerably higher probative value than substantive any truth. They are often rebuttable, requiring no more proof to contradict facts admitted in a court of law unless the judge specifically requests it.
In CBI vs V.C. Shukla[2], the Supreme Court clarified the difference between admission and confession, stating that confession is discretionary and undeviating consciousness of guilt and that the accused's confession might be used as negative evidence against him. Admissions acknowledged by the person admitting the fact, on the other hand, may not be regarded under the scope of Section 4, which is conclusive proof of facts admitted, and the confessed substance or facts can only be considered as substantive or probative evidence of admission.
A confession is a substantive evidence against its maker, and if it has been adequately recorded and has no legal flaws, it would be sufficient to condemn the accused who confessed, albeit the Court expects some confirmation before acting on it as a matter of caution. Even then, a little confirmation would suffice. However, the Court must be satisfied that a confession is voluntary and genuine before acting on it.
Sections 24, 25, and the relevant Section of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, deal with the circumstances in which a confession can be irrelevant.
In Section 24 of the same Act, numerous situations are described in which a confession based on such circumstances becomes immaterial. Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act states that a confession made by a person accused of an offence is irrelevant if the confession was obtained through any inducement, threat, or promise from a person in authority such as a police officer, magistrate, or Court. Another condition of this Section is that the inducement, threat, or promise must be concerning the charge of any crime.
The core of commission can be found in various statutes, but Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Sections 162 to 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code expressly address confessions.
"No words made to a Police Officer shall be regarded a confession to prove that confession against that individual who is accused in the case," according to Section 25. The terms mentioned in Section 25 of this Act are crucial since they ensure that any confession made by the accused to a police officer, regardless of circumstances, is entirely inadmissible as evidence in a court of law against the accused to show his guilt until it is presented.
Section 26 of the Criminal Code precludes judicial entities from proving an accused's guilt based on a confession provided to police while in prison. Section 26 repeals the clause in Section 25 that states that a confession was given to a police officer while in detention may be accepted it is recorded in the presence of a magistrate.
It is critical to examine the recommendations made by various law commissions in their findings to assess the model's suitability for the Indian criminal justice system's laws and needs, as these reports are specifically written to meet the changing needs of the legal system. The improvements required in the Indian Evidence Act have been the subject of two Law Commission Reports (the 185th and the 69th). The Reports have proposed similar modifications to Section 26, which makes a confession acceptable if made in the "immediate presence" of a magistrate.
The procedure of recording a confession made in front of a Magistrate is governed by Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which lays out the rules for confession recording in detail. When it comes to confessions made in front of a magistrate, there are two options: either they are recorded following Section 164, or they are not. The 69th Report (1997) suggested that the phrase "unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate" be replaced with "unless it is recorded by a Magistrate under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973." The 185th Law Commission Report on Indian Evidence Act (2003) partially adopted this recommendation, recommending that the words "unless a Magistrate records it under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973" be replaced with "unless a Magistrate records it per Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973." Both Reports have validated confessions made in front of a Magistrate if documented under Chapter XII of the CrPC, which deals with police investigation authorities.
"A statement contained in the FIR submitted by one of the accused in the case cannot, in any manner, be utilised against another accused," it was held in Aghnoo Nigeria Vs. The state of Bihar[3]. Even though it is incriminatory, the statement cannot be used against the accused who made it, nor can it be used for corroboration or contradiction unless the maker of the statement submits himself as a witness in the trial. It has minimal use as an admission against its maker alone under Sec. 21 of the Evidence Act unless the admission does not amount to a confession."
This part will look at the laws (statutory and judicial) that apply in several common law countries where a police officer's confession is accepted as evidence, as well as the precautions in place to prevent an involuntary confession. To draw a comparison, the author has taken up The provisions of the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
In the United Kingdom, confessions are primarily dealt with by Section 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which states that if the prosecution wishes to admit any confession as evidence, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was voluntary. If the Court has doubts about such a statement's reliability, it has the authority to deny admissibility to such confession. Oppression is defined in Section 8 of the same document, which includes torture, inhumane/degrading treatment, and violence. Interrogation Code Revised 2019 is a supplement to this provision. The courts have invoked the King v. Warickshal [4]notion of voluntariness on numerous occasions. The promise and threat tests are pretty similar to the quid pro quo test used in Canada. It is more likely that some threat or promise preceded an involuntary confession. Furthermore, under the test of the relationship between police operations and the suspect's reaction, the Court closely examines the investigative process, the procedures involved, and the suspect's reaction to the same. This test is based on the case of Callis v. Gunn[5], and it seeks to trace back the confession and its circumstances.
The issue of confession evidence is governed under Section 3501 of the 18 US Code. Subsection (a) of the same law states that before any confession is entered as evidence, the trial judge should determine its voluntariness in front of a jury. The circumstances surrounding the confession are outlined in subsection (b). There are also more safeguards in place to ensure that a confession is made voluntarily. The Miranda Rights, which were established as a result of Miranda v. Arizona,[6] require police officers to tell suspects of their rights to stay silent and have access to counsel, as well as the warning that everything they say can and will be used against them in Court. Before admitting a confession, the Court considers several factors, including the defendant's age, criminal history, and the absence of his lawyer. It meticulously examines the circumstances in which the suspect was held before confessing, such as placing him incommunicado, depriving him of food, drink, and sleep, or imprisonment in single cells, among other things. Before a confession is considered as evidence, all of these circumstances are considered.
Although the shame associated with tainted confessions will never be removed, regulations can be modified to meet evolving societal needs and expectations. Even the courts take a broader view of confessions made to police or while in police custody, deciding that such extrajudicial confessions can be entered as evidence if they are voluntary and inspire the Court's confidence. Although police violence and inhumane treatment by khaki-wearing officers are a fact, such techniques can be avoided by putting the prosecution's burden on showing the voluntariness and validity of such detention confessions. There is a need for the judiciary to use more advanced procedures to verify the truth of such confessions, as well as harsher penalties for officials who use such tactics. If custodial confessions are to be given evidential significance, a complete methodology is required. The initial study demonstrates the urgent necessity for judicial or legislative reforms.
REFRENCES
[1] Pohalya Motya Valvi vs State Of Maharashtra 1979 AIR 1979 SC 1949, 1979 CriLJ 1310, (1980) 1 SCC 530
[2] V. C. Shukla vs State Through C.B.I 1980 AIR 962, 1980 SCR (2) 380
[3] AIR 1966 SC 119
[4] (1783), 1 Leach 263, 168 ER 234.
[5] (1964) 1 Q.B. 495
[6] No. 759. Decided June 13, 1966.*